Abstract. This paper presents several methods to construct trapdoor block ciphers. A trapdoor cipher contains some hidden structure; knowledge of this structure allows an attacker to obtain information on the key or to decrypt certain ciphertexts. Without this trapdoor information the block cipher seems to be secure. It is demonstrated that for certain block ciphers, trapdoors can be built-in that make the cipher susceptible to linear cryptanalysis; however, nding these trapdoors can be made very hard, even if one knows the general form of the trapdoor. In principle such a trapdoor can be used to design a public key encryption scheme based on a conventional block cipher.
Introduction
Researchers have been wary of trapdoors in encryption algorithms, ever since the DES 9] was proposed in the seventies 15]. In spite of this, no one has been able to show how to construct a practical block cipher with a trapdoor. For most current block ciphers it is relatively easy to give strong evidence that there exist no full trapdoors. We de ne a full trapdoor as some secret information which allows an attacker to obtain knowledge of the key by using a very small number of known plaintexts, no matter what these plaintexts are or what the key is.
In this paper we consider partial trapdoors, i.e., trapdoors that not necessarily work for all keys, or that give an attacker only partial information on the key. We show that it is possible to construct block ciphers for which there exists a linear relation with a high probability; knowledge of such a relation allows for a linear attack which requires only a very small number of known plaintexts 13, 14] . A trapdoor is said to be detectable (undetectable) if it is computationally feasible (infeasible) to nd it even if one knows the general form of the trapdoor. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In x2 we explain how both detectable and undetectable trapdoors can be built into S-boxes.
x3 deals with trapdoors in round functions and complete block ciphers. Extensions are discussed in x4, and the conclusions are presented in x6. In this section we discuss the construction and hiding of trapdoors in S-boxes.
Construction
An m n substitution box (or S-box) can be de ned by its component functions: a collection of n Boolean functions f i (x), i = 1; : : : ; n, that take as input Boolean vectors x of dimension m. We start with an m (n ?1) S-box S(x) consisting of n ? 1 functions f i , i = 1; : : : ; n, i 6 = q selected randomly according to a uniform distribution (or following an arbitrary design criterion). The trapdoor m n S-box T(x) is derived from S(x) by adding an extra function in the following way. We choose an n-bit Boolean vector with q = 1 for some q with 1 q n and ensure that
(1) with probability p T . Then T(x) = 0 (2) holds with probability p T ( ). This is equivalent to a correlation c T ( ) = 2 p T ( ) ? 1 between the constant zero function and T(x). The trapdoor information is the vector .
Hiding the Trapdoor
If the S-box is claimed to be selected randomly according to a uniform distribution from all m n S-boxes, it is rather easy to hide a trapdoor in it. Indeed, for large values of n and m, the function f q (x) is computationally indistinguishable from a randomly selected one. We rst prove that this construction in fact introduces only one -vector with a high correlation value, not accompanied by a range of -vectors with`smaller' correlation values. Then we discuss the di culty of nding this trapdoor vector.
Introducing no more than one with high correlation: Suppose S(x) is an m (n ? 1) S-box selected such that for all n-bit vectors , 
Equation (3) holds with probability p T . If p T < 1 it is possible that (4) does not hold. Consider in this case the S-box T 0 (x) that results from (1) if p T = 1. All correlations of T 0 (x) are below c max . Thus T(x) can be considered as being constructed by applying (1?p T ) 2 m random changes to one component of T 0 (x). The probability that these random changes to the random S-box will result in a signi cant change of c max is very small.
Recovering If a cryptanalyst suspects a relation of the form (2), he can decide to examine the 2 n ? 1 non-zero values of exhaustively. If (1) holds with probability one, or p T ( ) = 1, then = 0. In this case the a (i) 's are linearly dependent and the linear relation between the vectors can be recovered in a very e cient way with Gaussian elimination on (5) . If the probability of (1) is smaller than one, the vectors a (i) are independent; is di erent from zero and unknown to the cryptanalyst, and the Hamming weight of is given by
The cryptanalyst can still try to recover by guessing a (low-weight) value for and solving the set of equations (5) . Equation (5) will only have a solution when the guess for is correct. A more complex strategy for the cryptanalyst is to use the following equations:
The d vectors (i) For example, consider a 10 40 S-box. There are 2 10 inputs, and for each input the equations may hold or not hold, resulting in a number of 2 2 10 possible vectors; 2 202 of them have Hamming weight 32. If we take d = 64, the probability p lc that is a linear combination of d randomly chosen (i) vectors is equal to 2 63 =2 202 . The work factor of this algorithm is determined by p lc and by the work to solve (6), which is O((2 m + n + d) 3 ) (note that the best asymptotic algorithms reduce the exponent from 3 to 2.376 6]).
By increasing d we increase p lc . However, if d becomes larger than a certain threshold value, spurious solutions for will start to appear that have a large Hamming weight. These unwanted solutions correspond to vectors with low correlation values. This e ect limits the use of Gaussian elimination. This algorithm will be be more useful than exhaustive search for if D and n are small, and m is large.
Bent Functions
The construction of x2.1 can be extended to deal with additional constraints imposed on the functions f i (x). For example, in some block ciphers (such as the CAST family 1]), it is necessary that the component functions f i (x) are bent functions. The Maiorana construction for bent functions 7] can then be used to obtain an S-box satisfying property (2): an m-bit bent function f(x) (m is even) is obtained from an m=2-bit permutation (y) and an arbitrary m=2-bit function g(z) as follows:
f(x) = f(y; z) = (y) z g(z) :
Here` ' denotes multiplication in GF (2 m=2 ). If two component functions f i (x) and f j (x) are derived from the same permutation (y), we obtain f i (y; z) f j (y; z) = g i (z) g j (z) ;
which can be chosen arbitrarily close to a constant function. To hide (2) in a bent function based S-box we proceed as follows. we choose a with even Hamming weight. We divide the set of indices where i = 1 arbitrarily into pairs. For each pair of indices we select a di erent mapping x 7 ! (y; z) and a di erent permutation . We de ne m=2-bit functions g i (z), and extend them to full m-bit functions by adding zero values. Then
with probability p T .
This construction shows that is possible to nd a set of bent functions that sum to an almost constant function. We believe that is also possible to use other bent functions in a similar construction. 3 Trapdoor Ciphers
In this section we propose several constructions for trapdoors in block ciphers starting from the building blocks, i.e., the round functions.
Trapdoor Round Functions
We now show that the trapdoors in S-boxes can be extended to trapdoors in the round function of a Hence the round function correlates with the constant zero function with a correlation equal to c F = c T (1) 
c T (2) c T (3) c T (4) :
As mentioned before, 8 32 S-boxes can be checked for this type of trapdoors. However, should CAST be extended in a natural way to an 128-bit block cipher by using 8 64-bit S-boxes, nding this trapdoor becomes very di cult. The technique can be extended to CAST variants where the exor operation is replaced by a modular addition or multiplication.
tLOKI: The expansion in the round function of LOKI91 5] allows for a subtle trapdoor, not visible in the individual S-boxes, but only in the round function.
We denote concatenation with`jj'. The round function of LOKI91 uses four times the same 12 8 S-box, and is de ned as: In this analysis the bit permutation P is not relevant and will be ignored. We can build a trapdoor into this round function as follows. Let a (1) (x), a (2) (x), a (3) (x), and a (4) (x) be four 8-bit Boolean functions and = (1) jj (2) jj (3) jj (4) 
Trapdoor Ciphers
The trapdoor round functions de ned above can be used to construct a trapdoor cipher. The resulting cipher will have iterative linear relations that approximate the output of every other round. For a cipher with r rounds, one needs br=2c ? 1 round approximations.
For example, consider a version of tCAST with 16 rounds, block size 80 bits, and using four 10 40 S-boxes. If p T = 1?2 ?5 we can recover the round key of the rst and the last round with Matsui's algorithm 2 13] using approximately 875 known plaintexts. Since the Hamming weight of is 32, the Gaussian elimination technique to nd the trapdoor will not work faster than exhaustive search. When building the trapdoor in the round function of tLOKI, we make use of the fact that in LOKI91 the key is added before the expansion (the input to the round function consists of 32 bits, but some of these are duplicated such that 48 bits are input to the S-boxes). In the DES the key is added after the expansion; in this case one can introduce trapdoors as well. A rst approach consists of choosing linear functions a (i) (x). In this way the absolute value of the correlation between bits is independent of the key. However this imposes a severe restriction on the number of possible trapdoors, which makes them easy to detect. (We checked the DES for these trapdoors and have not found any.) Another option is to hide several key dependent trapdoors. The key schedule could be carefully adapted such that only a small number of key bits have an actual in uence.
In a similar way one can hide di erentials into block ciphers, in order to make them vulnerable to di erential cryptanalysis 3]. However, exploitation of such trapdoors requires chosen rather than known plaintexts, which is much less practical. 5 Public Key Encryption
Besides the obvious use by government agencies to catch dangerous terrorists and drug dealers, trapdoor block ciphers can also be used for public key cryptography. For this application on selects a block cipher with variable S-boxes and makes it widely available (it is a system-wide public parameter). Bob generates a set of S-boxes with a secret trapdoor. These S-boxes form his public key. If Alice wants to send a con dential message to Bob, she generates a random session key, encrypts her message and a xed set of plaintexts and sends the ciphertexts to Bob. The set of plaintexts can be xed, or can be generated from a short seed using a pseudo-random bit generator. Bob uses the trapdoor and the known plaintexts to recover the session key and decrypts the message. There seems to be no obvious way to extend this construction to digital signatures. 6 Conclusion
We have shown that is rather easy to hide trapdoors in expanding S-boxes like the 8 32-boxes that are currently used in some ciphers. Extending the S-boxes to 10 80 bits makes the trapdoors undetectable. The expansion function that is used in LOKI and the DES can be used to combine`innocent' S-boxes into a trapdoor round function. The fact that key addition in the DES is done after the expansion creates the possibility for key dependent trapdoors.
We conclude that the danger of trapdoors in block ciphers is real. Defending against built-in trapdoors can be done in several ways. For some ciphers it is feasible check for several classes of trapdoors. A pro-active approach is to nourish a healthy distrust for other people's pseudo-random generators. A design that uses random elements should clearly explain the process of the pseudo-random bit generation, and, if applicable, the screening process. For algorithms which are kept secret, such as Skipjack, this is an even more worrying problem.
